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quick introductory guide to the facts ofLatinAmerican economic development, and to
the corresponding policy debates. Although the text is apparently aimed primarily at
a North American audience, students in Latin America and elsewhere will derive equal
benefit from it.
Matthias Lücke
Claassen, Emil-Maria (Ed.), Exchange Rate Policies in Developing and
Post -S 0 ciaIist Countries. An International Center for Economic Growth
Publication. San Francisco 1991. ICS Press. XIX, 443 pp.
The exchange rate regime is at the center ofdiscussions about appropriate reform
strategies for post-socialist countries as it has always been the case for traditional
developing countries. In the light ofthe controversy aboutthe comparabilityofthe two
country groups, it is to be appreciated that the thirteen papers included in the confer-
ence volume discuss the question of the optimal exchange rate regime for both post-
socialist and traditional developing countries. The book contains a discussion ofmost
ofthe relevant determinants ofan optimal exchange rate regime. The technical analysis
in the text is limited to graphical presentations (with only a few exceptions). The book
is therefore recommendable for economists andpolicy-makers looking for an introduc-
tion into the topic. But especially for this type ofreader it is always difficult to find the
main lines ofreasoning. The introduction given by Claassen (Ch. 1) is helpful because
it gives a good summary ofall arguments butit fails to make up a story and to address
the most interesting question: are there different conclusions for post-socialist and
traditional developing countries?
In order to answer this questions, I would recommend to start reading with the
contributions of MundeIl (Ch. 2) and Williamson (Ch. 14) because they can be inter-
preted as a general view, Le. the arguments provided are valid for all country groups.
Mundelldemonstrates in a generalequilibriumsetting thatanadjustment to real shocks
orthe stabilization ofthe price level is possible with fixed exchange rates as weIl as with
flexible exchange rates and a money supply target. Mundell's conclusion that in order
to generate confidence in money "...(t)he money supply will not suffice as an an-
chor..." and "...(t)he best means ofestablishing this anchor is to make the currency
convertible" (pp. 40f.) is only based onhis observation that"...flexible exchange rates
have not been successful in developimg countries" (p. 40). Mundell proposes a narrow
concept ofconvertibility, Le. convertibility ofdomestic money at a fixed price into a
stable currency (currency convertibility) and into gold (asset convertibility). The impli-
cation is that monetary policy is completely passive and dependent on (gold) reserve
flows and the Central Bank acts as a currency board.
Mundell's conclusion is at least based on a benign neglect ofbad experiences with
fixed exchange rates in developing countries. It is sufficient to mention the bad experi-
ence of the Southern Cone countries at the beginning ofthe 1980s. Williamson raises
additional doubts from a general perspective whether a fixed exchange rate is an
optimal exchange rate regime. First, "(w)here the inflation rate has too much momen-
tum to be stopped by anexchange ratecommitment..., I recommend a real target..."
(p. 401), i.e. a real exchange rate target. Otherwise inflation is reduced at the cost of
externaldisequilibrium. Second, "(e)ven ifthetarget is initially set correctly, itwill need
to change ifa permanent real shock creates a need for payments adjustment" (p. 401).
The implicit assumption made by Williamson is thatthe prices ofnon-traded goods are
not as flexible as (implicitly) assumed in Mundell's general equilibrium setting.
Williamson goes a step further in arguing that the equilibrium real exchange rate has
to be estimated. This is ofcourse nearly impossible even for developed countries with
relatively stable economies. Additionally, it is not necessary to calculate a target. ARezensionen - Book Reviews 623
backward-oriented passive crawling peg (adjustment ofthe nominal exchange rate for
past inflation differentials) with a band allows for changes ofthe real exchange rate by
market forces, Le. either by exchange rate changes (within the band) or by monetary
policy (outside the band for the nominal exchange rate). The target is always the actual
real exchange rate [Schweickert, 1993a].
The central contribution with respect to the situation of developing countries is
provided by Aghevli and Montiel (Ch. 8). This chapter contains an empirical part
sufficient to inform the reader about all relevant developments in the recent past and
to demonstrate the tendency to allow for greater flexibility of exchange rates. The
analytical part gives a very good, non-technical summary offour issues related to the
choice ofan exchange rate regime which have been discussed recently: time inconsis-
tency ofpolicy announcements, real overvaluation, balance-of-payments crisis and the
interdependence offiscal and monetary policy. The time-inconsistency literature shows
that the authorities have an incentive to renege on former commitments. Ifmonetary
policy is made completely passive - as proposed by MundeIl - monetary authorities
would loose thepossibility to do so. An institutionalized fixed exchange ratewould thus
raise the credibility ofareform program. But there may be socially desirable exchange
rate changes. Real exchange rates in developing countries tend to be overvalued.
Aghevli and Montiel show that there may be contractionary effects if the nominal
exchange rate is devalued in order to achieve real exchange rate adjustment but they
conclude that these can only be short-run effects and the alternative would be to reduce
the real exchange rate by keeping the domestic inflation rate below those ofthe major
trading partners. But there are not only doubts whether a fixed exchange rate is
desirable - it mayaiso be not sustainable. The monetary contraction necessary to
reduce domestic inflation below foreign inflation comes automatically in a fixed ex-
change rate regime and a passive monetary policy via reserve outflows. These reserve
outflows may reduce the stock ofreserves dramatically, leading to a balance-of-pay-
ments crisis, Le. a ron on the remaining reserves. The monetarycontraction also implies
a fiscal discipline which may not be sustainable in countries with underdeveloped tax
systems. "Tying one's hands" therefore does not necessarily raise credibility.
The relationship between monetary and fiscal policy is a very important one. Both
fixed exchange rate regimes and flexible exchange rates with money supply rules need
the independence of monetary policy from fiscal policy. The monetary discipline re-
quired for achieving a given inflation target is the same in both regimes. It has to be
possible given the fiscal constraint. The contributions ofFernandez (Ch. 11) and Pinto
(Ch. 12) demonstrate that this is not given if a large share of the public budget is
financed by the inflation tax. Femandez describes the futile attempts by Argentine
authorities to circumvent monetary discipline by price controls and to avoid fiscal
adjustment by borrowing on a thin domestic capital market and creating a huge
quasi-fiscal deficit ofthe central bank. Authorities lost their remaining credibility and
a run offoreign exchange led to hyperinflation. Pinto analyses the trade-off between
raising an inflation tax and raising a premium on the foreign exchange market by an
overvalued official exchange rate. Ifthe premium is reduced by exchange rate adjust-
ment and the govemment suffers a loss in revenue, it will have to increase revenue from
theinflation tax orto implement a fiscal reform. The conclusionfor the currency regime
- not drawn by Fernandez and Pinto - is that without a fiscal reform which makes the
government budget independent from collecting an inflation tax or levying a premium
on foreign exchange the implementation ofanchors for the monetary policy is impos-
sible.
So far, it has been assumed that allowing the real exchange rate to adjust to its
equilibrium level and reducing inflation should determine monetary and exchange rate
policy in developing countries. Actually, Lal(Ch. 10) is able to identify real exchange624 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
rate misalignment and acute inflation as the main causes for growth collapses in
developing countries. He also demonstrates that there is no clear correlation between
a type ofshock and changes in the equilibrium real exchange rate. Effects ofterms-of-
trade shocks, e.g., depend on the labour intensity of the production of non-traded
goods. That changes ~n the equilibrium real exchange rate depend on the structure of
the economy is also demonstrated by Edwards (eh. 9). Effects ofcurrent and capital
account liberalization depend on the relative strength ofincome and substitution ef-
fects. In the most likely cases "...a capital account liberalization will require an
equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation in the present period, a trade reform will
call for a real exchange rate depreciation" (p. 251). In his conclusion that "...since
capitalliberalization tends to frustrate the depreciation required to sustain trade re-
form, the capital account should be opened up after the current account has been fully
liberalized" (p. 251), Edwards is only concerned with the sequencing ofliberalization.
The relevant conclusion with respect to exchange rate policy is only implicit in his part
dealing with the role ofmonetary factors. Ifthere are changes in the equilibrium real
exchange rate due to liberalization efforts, these have to be seen as real shocks like e.g.
terms-of-trade shocks. Theexchange rate system should be able to adjustthe actualreal
exchange rate to the changing real exchange rate equilibrium in order to preserve
internal and external equilibrium. Lal's and Edward's contributions show that real
exchange rate equilibrium at a low level ofinflation should be the aim ofmonetary and
exchange rate policy. They also show that it is difficult in a developing country context
to target the real exchange rate because the impact ofinternal and external shocks are
difficult to predict.
Ifthe main disequilibria have been removed, the clearcut aim ofreducing inflation
and overvaluation is substituted by stabilizing the real exchange rate at its equilibrium
level. Themain problemfor the moreadvanceddevelopingcountrieslike the East Asian
NICsis to define the appropriate real exchange rate as a target for exchange rate policy.
ParkandPark(Ch. 13) show thatthechoice is basically between the yen andthedollar.
But the need to choose a basket ofthese currencies stems from the attempt to preserve
monetary stability and to manage the exchange rate at the same time. Park and Park
reject the possibility to float - which would solve the problem- because of(l) improper
macroeconomic policies pursued by majorcurrencycountries, (iz) expectation ofexces-
sive capital flows and (iii) "...if, ..., trade and financialliberalization are the priority
reforms, then (the countries) should try to maintain a correcdy aligned exchange rate,
taking into consideration the possible effects offinancialliberalization" (p. 376). The
first and the second argument are rather arguments in favour ofa free float in order
to insulate theeconomy andto discouragecapitalflows by exchange ratechanges. With
respect to the third argument, it has been shown by Edwards that changes in the
equilibrium real exchange rate are difficult to predict in a liberalization process. Addi-
tionally, the reputation of East Asian NICs for monetary and fiscal discipline should
guarantee relatively stable and market-determined exchange rates.
Contrary to the East Asian NICs, the situation of post-socialist countries is even
worse compared with a typical developing country. They are even further away from
macroeconomic equilibrium and they lack market institutions. Lavigne (Ch. 7) con-
cludes that "...a multilateral monetary arrangement providing for settlements in the
domestic currencies, with a commitment to make these currencies gradually fully con-
vertible (for residents and non-residents) within the area and outside the area..."
(p. 200) should be implemented in order to promote intra-regional trade and to econ-
omize oninternational reserves. Itis rathersurprising thatshearrived atthis conclusion
after reviewing negative experiences with such an arrangement. There are three basic
arguments against a payments arrangement. First, internationalreserves are saved only
to a limited extent. The bulk ofpossible savings could be realized by bilateral arrange-Rezensionen - Book Reviews 625
ments between central banks. Second, trade is promoted by such a system only to the
extent that there are implicit subsidies paid due to misaligned exchange rates and
limited convertibility. Third, it is generally accepted that convertibility is badly needed
in post-socialist countries in order to import the world market price structure. In such
a situation, subsidies which reduce the incentives to adjust exchange rates and to make
the currency convertible are counterproductive.
A currency reform is also discussed as an institutional precondition for the reform
of the monetary system. Claassen (Ch. 5) reviews the three currency reforms in Ger-
many: the introduction of the rentenmark in 1923, the introduction of the deutsche
mark in 1948, and the monetary union in 1990. With respect to the latter, Claassen
concludes that "...the fiscal burden for the Federal Republic is the maximum possi-
ble..." (p. 137) but that"...(n)ational solidarity will make iteasier for Germany than
for Europe to support the fiscal burden..." (p. 142). Iffiscal transfers are less likely
in a situation where the recipient maintains full fiscal sovereignty, it can be doubted
whether a currency reform by introducing a stable European currency as a legal tender
is a viable option for post-socialist countries. According to Claassen, these essential
ingredients of a currency reform are the elimination of the monetary overhang and
signalling the credibility of future monetary policy. In Germany, the monetary over-
hang was reduced by inflation in 1923 and by confiscation ofliquidassets in 1948. Both
currency reforms had in common that the future monetary policy was credible. In my
view, this gives the two ingredients ofa currency reform different weights. Germany's
experience shows that the credibility ofthe future monetary policy matters more than
the currency reform, Le. the technique ofreducing the monetary overhang.
The credibility of monetary policy in post-socialist countries needs other institu-
tional reforms. A monetary and exchange rate system can only stabilize an economy if
money supply affects prices and ifmoney supply could be controlled - either automat-
ically in a fixed exchange rate system with a passive monetary policy or by a money
supply rule. If the excess supply of money should affect prices, prices have to be
liberalized before. However, Brenner (Ch. 6) argues that the liberalization of prices
should be postponed until after property rights have been defined, a bankruptcylaw has
been set up, hard budget constraints for publicly owned enterprises have been set up,
and an efficient financial system works. Without these institutional preconditions,
entrepreneurs would not set prices according to competitive pressures, relative prices
would be distorted, and a supply response would not be observed. But it has been
shown by history that the old system ofcontrolled prices is also not able to increase
production in an efficient way. Moreover, many goods are traded at their black market
prices anyway. Price liberalization then means to legalize the allocation process. Infla-
tionary pressures - except for the elimination ofaninitial monetary overhang- are not
to be expected in the case ofa tight monetary policy. The distortion ofrelative prices
stresses the need to import the world market price structure. This implies a uniform im-
port tariff, abolition ofnon-tariff barriers and external convertibility. Ample evidence
from developing countries shows that external convertibility without monetary disci-
pline fuels imports for consumption orfor inefficient investment purposes. Thus, mone-
tary control complementing price liberalization seems to be the central institutional
requirement in the transformation ofpost-socialist countries into market economies.
McKinnon (Ch. 3) analyses in a straightforward way how to implement monetary
control in an economy in which the capital stock ofnearly all important enterprises is
owned and controlled by the government. According to his proposal, the banking
system should consist only ofa central bank which takes deposits from publicly owned
enterprises, privatized enterprises, and private households. Deposits from publicly
owned enterprises are not convertible, Le. their withdrawal has to be authorized. The
central bank gives credit to publicly owned enterprises and to the government only.626 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
Private enterprises have to finance capital accumulation out of their own resources.
This should provide an incentive to reduce hoarding ofreal goods.
Mc Kinnon's financial system accepts the fact that monetary policy depends on
fiscal policy in the case of post-socialist countries. If independence of monetary and
fiscal policy cannotbe achieved because a tax system takes time to be implemented and
toworkefficiently, itis a goodideatomakethedependenceofmonetarypolicyonfiscal
policy explicit. This is the main advantage ofMcKinnon's proposal. The main flaw of
McKinnon'ssystem is thatitintroduces financial repression. Itis a curious fact thatthe
same author demonstrated in a seminal contribution to economic theory the negative
effects offinancial repression oneconomicdevelopment. Therefore, the bankingsystem
proposed has to be seen as a starting point for financial reform which has to be
complemented by a prudent banking regulation allowing for the operation ofprivate
banks. The most interesting question inthe contextofthe bookis ofcourse, ifthere are
conclusions for the exchange rate system. Rearranging the balance sheet ofthe central
bankas proposed by McKinnon is clearly inconsistent with exchange rate management
and especially with a fixed exchange rate regime because there is no reserve component
of the money supply. But it is consistent with flexible exchange rates and a money
supply target which takes into consideration the fiscal needs.
All in all, the conference volume shows that there are additional (institutional)
reform requirements in the case ofpost-socialist countries but that the general conclu-
sions from the literature dealing with appropriate monetary and exchange rate policy
in a developing country context maintain their validity. This means that the strong
arguments for exchange rate flexibility in developing countries [see Balassa, 1990;
Corden, 1993] also apply to post-socialistcountries [see Williamson, 1991; Schweickert,
1993 b]. Ifthe experience ofdeveloping countries is not considered in the design ofthe
monetary system, post-socialist countries ron the risk to repeat mistakes and to find
themselves inthepositionofdevelopingcountriesinthe 1970s, Le. witha still high share
ofpublic enterprises, highly distorted markets and significant macroeconomic disequi-
libria.
Oneoftheflaws oftheconference volumeis thelackofsuchconclusions. Moreover,
the title ofthe book ("Exchange Rate Policy...) provokes the expectation that each
chapter draws conclusions on exchange rate policy. This is not the case. My own
conclusions implicit and explicit in this review should be seen as a hypothesis which
could be substantiated by the contributions included in the volume. The importance of
the issue makes it worth to check this hypothesis by reading the book.
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